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I. Easy Cases - Hard Cases
1. Easy Case: ‘oil-of-elf.de’
In previous conflicts about domain names within the global address system, German 
judges only had to answer relatively simply legal questions. Under which conditions 
does a domain name, which is easily confused with another name, infringe the rights 
of the name owner? Pervious decisions have identified infringement in the following 
cases:
• The name and domain name are, to a significant degree, identical or may be easily 
confused with one another,
• The user of the domain name possesses no personal right to the name, and
• The name usage is likely to promote mistakes about the origin of the web-site.1
Apart from cases of identical names2 and of the use of generic concepts,3 which 
demanded more differentiated juridical treatment, more complex, underlying 
1 Cf., Patrick Mayer, ‘Marke oder Meinungsfreiheit? Warum Greenpeace zu Recht die 
Domain „oil-of-elf“ benutzt hat, available at
http://www.freedomforlinks.de/Pages/oil-of-elf.html.
2 Cf., BGHZ 149, 191 – „shell.de“ and the commentary of Dietrich C. Becker, Von Namen 
und Nummern – Zur Behandlung von Kollisionen unerträglicher Rechtsmassen im 
Internet, in RECHTSVERFASSUNGSRECHT, (Gunther Teubner/Christian Joerges 
eds., forthcoming); Jörg Dittrich, Namensverletzung gem. § 12 BGB durch eine 
Domain trotz Gleichnamigkeit, JurPC: INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
RECHTSINFORMATIK, Web-Dok. 144/2002, available at http://www.jurpc.de; M. 
2considerations have rarely played a role, since rights could only ever be asserted in 
very clear cases, for example, where the domain name user neither possessed a right 
to the domain name, nor could make a justified case for its use.
The case of ‘oil-of-elf.de’ was to prove otherwise.4 The environmental protection 
organisation, Greenpeace, had published comments critical of the environmental 
policies of the TotalFinaElf oil company on a web-site with the domain name, ‘oil-of-
oil-elf.de’. The company successfully requested an injunction from the Berlin High 
Court (Landgericht).5 The Court gave its usual grounds for the decision. The domain, 
‘oil-of-elf.de’, included the protected name, Elf, and so infringed upon the rights of 
the oil company. The Berlin Appeal Court (Kammergericht), by contrast, found for 
Greenpeace and lifted the injunction.6 The Court made it clear that consideration of 
the immediate questions of name theft or potential confusion about name origin, 
would not suffice for judgment. Instead, the primary question was one of whether, in 
case of political conflict, an environmental organisation would be to use a domain 
name incorporating targeted elements of the trademark of the oil company under 
critical fire. In detail, the Appeal Court had to ascertain whether:
Körner, Gleichnamigkeitskonflikte bei Internet-Domain-Namen – Die „shell.de“ 
Entscheidung des BGH, NJW 3442 (2002).
3 Cf., on the use of generic concepts as domain names, ‘Mitwohnzentrale.de’, BGH, Judgment 
of 17.05.2001 – I ZR 251/99 – , BGHZ 148, 13; for case notations, cf., Dietrich C. 
Becker, supra note 2; Peer Zumbansen, Paving The Way For Cyberlaw: Two FCJ 
Decisions on Domain Names, 2 GERMAN LAW JOURNAL (2001), available at
www.germanlawjournal.com/printphp?id=28.
4 Cf., for a comprehensive review of the history of the case: 
http://archiv.greenpeace.de/GP_DOK_3P/BRENNPUN/F0011D.HTM.
5
 LG Berlin, Judgment of 18.01.2001 – 16.0.33/01, 
http://archiv.greenpeace.de/GP_DOK_3P/BRENNPUN/F0011C6.PDF.
6
 Kammergericht, Judgment of 23.10.2001 – 5 U 101/01, JurPC: INTERNET-ZEITSCHRIFT 
FÜR RECHTSINFORMATIK, Web-Dok. 130/2002, http//www.jurpc.de.
3• the domain name ‘oil-of-elf.de’ infringed upon TotalFinaElf’s name right at all;
• and, where this was so, whether the critical usage of the Domain ‘oil-of-elf.de’ 
would not in this case be protected by free speech rights; as well as,
• whether, in such conflicts, fundamental rights take precedence over simple trading 
name and name rights (in other words, the underlying fundamental rights of 
TotalFinaElf).
The Appeal Court concluded that there had been no infringement of the oil company’s 
trading name, since both the wording and purpose of §15 MarkenG (Trademark Law) 
were predicated upon abusive usage ‘within (normal) business relations’. Greenpeace, 
by contrast, had acted within the remit of its associational status, and with solely 
idealistic aims.
Neither did the name right provisions of §12 BGB (Civil Code) furnish increased 
protection for trading names ‘outside’ the normal course of business. No damage to 
interests was proven, since there was no confusion as to the origins of the web-site. 
Even where search engines were used, the contents of the page were so 
incontrovertible and clear as to dismiss any possible doubt as to their origins. 
Informed web-users would naturally be aware of the large choice of search engines 
available, such that they would also not be discouraged from undertaking further 
searches for the web-site of the oil company, should their first search have led to the 
Greenpeace web-site. In the opinion of the Court, the same would hold true for ‘Meta-
Tags’ (e.g., Company key words) which facilitate web-site searches by search 
engines.
A notable feature of the case, was the Court’s argument upon the application of 
fundamental free speech rights to private actors within the Internet. This was the first 
explicit application within Germany of fundamental rights to a private conflict on 
domain names. In relation to the question of whether the oil company’s name had 
been used ‘without authorisation’ under the terms of §12 BGB, the Appeal Court 
brought the application of free speech rights to private parties within the Internet into 
play. In this concrete case, the balancing of the free speech rights of an environmental 
organisation (Art.5, para.1 GG [German Constitution]) against the fundamental 
economic rights of an oil company (Art.12, para.1; Art.14, paea.1 GG) was resolved 
4in favour of the precedence of freedom of opinion. The core purpose of the 
registration of the provocative domain name ‘oil-of-elf’ was to ensure greater public 
awareness about environmental conflict and was thus, in the opinion of the Court, 
protected by Art.5, para.1 GG.
American literature addresses such cases under the title SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit 
Against Public Participation).7 Powerful economic actors deploy their trademark 
rights, their name rights or copyright law in an effort to undermine potential political 
critique.8 In this manner, political conflict on environmental protection and the 
responsibility of German producers and consumers for environmental scandals in 
(seemingly) faraway countries might yet find itself bogged down in the marshes of 
German trademark and name law.9 Nonetheless, thanks to the Appeal Court, 
Greenpeace was able to enforce its fundamental free speech rights in its attempts to 
publicise the economic interests of Elf.
2. Hard Case: ‘oil-of-elf.com’
Now, however, for a small variation. What would the case have looked like had 
Greenpeace Germany not registered the name, ‘oil-of-elf’, under the country specific 
Top Level Domain (country code TLD), ‘de.’, but under the generic Top Level 
Domain (generic TLD), ‘com.’, only then to be confronted with a claim by the French 
Oil Company for dissolution or transference of the domain under the ICANN Uniform 
Dispute Resolution Policy (in the following, UDRP)?
7 See Patrick Mayer, supra note 1. 
8 Cf., from American jurisprudence, the ‘Scientology-case’, Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom 
On-Line Communications Servs., Inc., 923, F. Supp. 1231, (N. D. Ca. 1995); cf., on 
conflict between copyright and free speech with regard to the aforementioned case, 
Yochai Benklar, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on 
Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999), at 356.
9 See Patrick Mayer, supra note 1. 
5Intuition tells us that the case would have been decided in the same manner. This, 
however, is far from a given. In the first case, the decision falls to a State court, which 
is bound by national law. In the second, the case would be heard by an Administrative 
Panel of a private Dispute Resolution Organisation, such as the WIPO-Arbitration 
Center, which is accredited by ICANN and which is obliged to adjudicate according 
to UDRP and its explanatory rules, rather than in line with national law. Furthermore, 
our case is far from being a hypothetical one. Administrative Panels have often been 
called upon to adjudicate in cases similar to that of ‘oil-of-elf’; cases in which the 
names of known concerns have been deployed, together with the affix ‘sucks’, on 
web-sites, in an attempt to parody and/or critique the companies and their original 
web-sites. To date, 35 ‘CompanyNameSucks’ cases have appeared before ICANN 
Panels.
 UDRP does not deal with country-specific domains and only allows complaints 
against generic Top Level Domains (TLDs), such as ‘.com’, ‘.net’ and ‘.org’.10 UDRP 
applies only to those domain conflicts in which a trademark owner claims the 
existence of an abusive domain registration. In our particular case then, the Oil 
Company TotalFinaElf would need to prove under §4a UDRP:
(i) that the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or 
service mark in which the complainant has rights;
(ii) that the respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the domain name; 
and 
(iii) that the domain name has been registered and is being used in bad faith .
The UDRP conditions are cumulative.
ICANN Panel’ decisions on the danger of confusion are highly variable. The so-called 
‘CompanyNameSucks’ cases are exemplary in this regard. In part, the Panels have 
10
 Currently, UDRP has no application to domain names in the country-specific Top-Level-
Domains (ccTLDs), with the exception of the country-specific Top Level Domains of 
individual States (e.g., Tuvalu).
6grounded their findings of a danger of confusion in the argument that non-English 
speaking internet-users will not understand the word ‘sucks’ as a critique or parody, 
but as a word associated with the trademark or service mark of the complainant’s 
domain.11 By contrast, other cases have seen the rejection of a danger of confusion 
since use of the word ‘sucks’ makes the critical content of the web-site immediately 
apparent.12 In our case, the similarity of the domain name ‘oil-of-elf’ to the 
complainant firm’s trademark, ‘Elf-Oil’, is so great that a Panel might well find in 
favour of a danger of confusion.
11 Cf., for example, Société Accor contre M. Philippe Hartmann (D2001-0007): ‘under French 
law, whether a trademark may be freely used for a parody is controversial ... in the 
case of a public not speaking English, or even speaking some English but being 
unfamiliar with the slang, the meaning of the word ‘sucks’ may not be understood, 
nor its use in order to designate Web sites aimed at ‘cyberprotest’; Diageo plc v. John 
Zuccarini, Individually and t/a Cupcake Patrol (D2000 – 0996): ‘As the Internet 
extends far beyond the Anglophone world, a more difficult question arises as to 
whether non-English speaking users of the Internet would be confused into believing 
that such a site is owned and/or controlled by the Complainant. Because the word 
‘sucks’ is a slang word with which all English speakers may not be familiar, this 
Administrative Panel concludes that there may well be circumstances where Internet 
users are not aware of the abusive connotations of the word and consequently 
associate the domain name with the owner of the trademark’; National Westminster 
Bank PLC v. Purge I.T. and Purge I.T. Ltd (D2000 – 0636); Caixa d’Estalvis y 
Pensions de Barcelona ("La Caixa") v. Namezero.com (D2001-0360): ‘Although 
converting "c"s into "k"s is a way of expressing feelings similar to those expressed by 
the word "sucks" in English, this practice is part of a countercultural Latin jargon and 
is unlikely to be understood by most Internet users throughout the world. They would 
not understand LAKAIXA as a political parody of LA CAIXA, but as something 
phonetically identical, and graphically confusingly similar, with respect to 
Complainant’s world-famous trademark LA CAIXA.’
12
 Lockheed Martin Corporation v. Dan Parisi (D2000-1015); McLane Company, Inc. v. Fred 
Craig (D2000-1455).
7The issue would therefore be one of whether the domain was registered in bad faith. 
According to §4b UDRP, this decision is to be taken in line with the following non-
exhaustive list of indicators:
(i) the respondent has registered or acquired the domain name primarily for 
purposes of selling, renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name 
registration to the complainant who is the owner of the trademark or service 
mark or to a competitor of that complainant, for valuable consideration in 
excess of the respondent’s documented out-of-pocket costs directly related to 
the domain name; or
(ii) the respondent has registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of 
the trademark or service mark from reflecting the mark in a corresponding 
domain name, provided that the respondent has engaged in a pattern of such 
conduct; or
(iii) the respondent has registered the domain name primarily for the purpose of 
disrupting the business of a competitor; or
(iv) the respondent has intentionally used the domain name to attract, for 
commercial use, Internet users to the respondent’s web site or other on-line 
location, by creating a likelihood of confusion with the complainant's mark as 
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the respondent’s web 
site or location or of a product or service on the respondent’s web site or 
location.
§4c UDRP states that registration and use of the domain name (§4a (iii) UDRP) will 
not be found to have been in bad faith where the domain name user possesses its own 
rights in the name, or can show a justified interest in the domain name. This is the 
case when:
(i) before any notice of the dispute, the respondent has used or made 
demonstrable preparations to use the domain name or a name corresponding to 
the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods or services; 
or
8(ii) the respondent has been commonly known by the domain name, even if he has 
acquired no trademark or service mark rights; or
(iii) the respondent is making a legitimate non-commercial or fair use of the 
domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert 
consumers or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.
Do critical and protest sites fall under the jurisdiction of the UDRP? And must 
ICANN Panels pay due regard to fundamental free speech rights? If this were the 
case, the horizontal effects of fundamental rights would also apply against the firm, 
Elf. It is often stated that ICANN Panels are not suitable fora for the consideration of 
fundamental rights, and that the jurisdictional reach of the UDRP is restricted to cases 
of abusive registration. However, and all such fevered critique notwithstanding, 
ICANN Panels have concerned themselves with hot topics such as the conflict 
between trademarks and freedom of opinion, and, in so doing, have noticeably 
increased the jurisdictional reach of the UDRP; quite possibly since supposed 
exceptions are more commonly the rule, while cases of cybersquatting are rare.
In some cases, ICANN panels have made explicit recourse to the term ‘free speech’, 
albeit in vague and, legally-speaking, ineffective form, and have declared the 
management of a domain name in the pursuit of political free speech to be legitimate. 
In other cases, however, they have held critique and parody to be legitimate, but have 
nonetheless banned individual critical domains.
3. Unanswered Questions
Which fundamental rights and which national legal order might the ICANN Panel in 
our case call upon however? The argument that ICANN panels are not courts with an 
adjudicative function, but mere administrative panels with a duty to oversee and 
implement proceedings, does little to clarify matters.13 The so-called ‘Administrative 
Panels’ do currently give final decision in the majority of legal disputes. Even though 
there may yet be a possibility to involve a national court, this is seldom the case, and 
13 Cf., for example, Thorsten Bettinger, ICANN’s Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy, CR 234 (2000), at 235.
9the decisions of the Panels are also quickly and effectively implemented by electronic 
means. Panel decisions are implemented by web-site’ registration and accreditation 
providers (host providers), who contractually oblige themselves to abide by UDRP 
provisions and also include them within their contracts with domain users. In line with 
UDRP provisions, host providers transfer or dissolve a disputed site upon receipt of a 
Panel Decision from an ICANN accredited Dispute Resolution Provider.
Although ICANN Panels apply UDRP provisions rather than State legal norms, they 
often refer to US law. As a consequence, the First Amendment of the US Constitution 
would be relevant to this case. In other words, the issue would be one of the 
extraterritorial impacts of the US legal order upon the Internet. Following decades 
dominated by the real-world cultural imperialism of the ‘American way of life’, are 
we now witnessing a new expansion of the lex americana into the virtual world?14
The horizontal effects of fundamental rights on private actors would then be governed 
by the ‘state action doctrine’ of the American Constitution.15
14 Cf., Samuel P. Huntington, Transnational Organizations in World Politics, 25 WORLD 
POLITICS 333 (1973), at 344: ‘Transnationalism is the American way of expansion’.
15 Cf., for the general discussion of the application of the ‘state action doctrine’ to the Internet: 
Paul S. Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of 
Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COL. L. REV. 1263 
(2000); Irene Dmitrieva, Will Tomorrow Be Free? Application of State Action 
Doctrine to Private Internet Providers, in THE INTERNET UPHEAVAL 3 
(Vogelsang/Compaine eds., 2000); Steven Gey, Reopening the Public Forum – From 
Sidewalks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 1535 (1998); David Goldstone, A Funny 
Thing Happened on the Way to the Cyber Forum: Public vs. Private in Cyberspace 
Speech, 69 U. COLOR. L. REV. 1 (1998); Noah D. Zatz, Sidewalks in Cyberspace: 
Making Space for Public Forums in the Electronic Enviroment, 12 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 149 (1998). By contrast, the problem of the horizontal effect of fundamental 
rights within the Internet seems to have troubled German doctrinal thought very little 
at all, cf., the supplementary remarks of Karl H. Ladeur, Ausschluss von Teilnehmern 
an Diskussionsforen im Internet, MMR 787 (2001); with regard to the blocking of 
content by the host provider, cf., Rufus Pichler, Meinungsfreiheit, Kunstfreiheit und 
neue Medien: Zwischen interessengerechter Auflösung von Rechtsgutkollisionen und 
10
As an alternative, however, the private international law principle that the relevant 
national law ‘that the panel determines to be appropriate in the light of all of the 
relevant circumstances’, as explicitly stated in the WIPO Final report (as well as §15 
of the ICANN Rules16), might prevail. In such a case, the question would be one of 
whether, in line with the applicable national conflicts rule, French private law, and 
indirectly the French Constitution, or German private law together with the German 
doctrine of horizontal direct effect would apply.17
There is also a third way, which might prove of particular interest with regard to the 
Internet: are we seeing the development of an autonomous lex digitalis analogous to 
the lex mercatoria, with its own autonomous ordre public transnational, in line with 
which courts of arbitration would be required to develop internet-specific decisions on 
fundamental rights and their horizontal effects within the Internet?
Our small variation from ‘.de’ to ‘.com’ has thus muddied the waters considerably. 
We are potentially concerned here with a national fragmentation of Internet law, 
which will allow for the application of national law to nationally defined TLDs. As 
the press has reported, Google has already secretly begun to apply different 
fundamental rights standards, at least to the degree that it has filtered out radical 
political pages in French and German TLDs (‘.de’ and ‘.fr’) from its Google.de search 
machine results, but still shows these contents on Google.com.18 But this is only the 
start of our difficulties. The question in relation both to the non-nationally defined 
TLDs, ‘.com’ etc. and, although to a lesser degree, to the national domains, such as 
"Zensur", AfP 429 (1999), at 433; and Franz C. Mayer, Recht und Cyberspace, NJW 
1782 (1996), at 1787. 
16
 § 15 (a) ICANN Rules: ‘A Panel shall decide a complaint on the basis of the statements and 
documents submitted and in accordance with the Policy, these Rules and any rules 
and principles of law that it deems applicable.’
17
 On the problem of the law applicable to trademark conflicts in the Internet, cf., Annette 
Kur, Territorialität versus Globalität – Kennzeichenkonflikte im Internet, WRB 935 
(2000).
18 Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung, 28.10.2002, at 46: ‘.com, .de oder .fr?’.
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‘.de’, is thus not simply one of whether horizontal direct effect is also applicable 
within the virtual realm of the Internet. Instead, it is similarly one of which particular 
national fundamental rights will be applicable in the light of collision of law 
provisions. Even more troublesome, the issue is likewise one of whether the 
transnational nature of the subject matter excludes application of the rules of private 
international law altogether, such that conflict of laws provisions will demand the 
development of autonomous, internet-specific, material norms on the horizontal 
effects of fundamental rights.19 Additionally, problems arise with regard to the exact 
legal status of those remarkable hybrid bodies of public and private law, the ICANN 
Panels;20 as do final doubts about the legal quality of the rules that they apply to 
fundamental rights issues within Cyberspace. 
4. Theses
(1) Internet Appropriate Horizontal Effect
Under German law at least the digital horizontal effect of fundamental rights is 
uncontested. But what impact does the term ‘indirect’ horizontal effect have in such a 
context? We are not merely concerned here with the transmission of fundamental 
rights through the general clauses of private law. Instead, the issue is one of the 
autonomous reproduction of fundamental rights within the independent logic of the 
social system of the Internet.
19 Cf., on the development of material norms in private international law see generally
Gerhard Kegel/Klaus Schurig, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT, (6th Edition), 
First Section, §8 III4, Materiellprivatrechtliche Lösungen im IPR, at 269; E. 
Steindorff, SACHNORMEN IM INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT (1958).
20 Cf., on this question, Michael Froomkin, Semi-Private International Rulemaking: Lessons 
Learned from the WIPO Domain Name Process, in REGULATING THE GLOBAL 
INFORMATION SOCIETY 211 (C. T. Mardsen ed. 2000); see with regard to ICANN, 
Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN: Between the Public and the Private, Comments Before 
Congress, 14 BERKLEY TECH. L. J. (1999), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/btlj/articles/vol14/Zittrain/html/reader.html.
12
(2) Applicability of Fundamental Rights within Autonomous Internet Law 
The question of whether ICANN Panels should or, indeed, ‘may’, also enforce 
fundamental rights against private parties within the realm of the semi-autonomous 
legal order of ICANN-policy is, however, a highly contentious one. The thesis on this 
point is as follows: ICANN Panels concretise fundamental rights within Cyberspace 
on the basis of a fiction. They draw upon the fiction of a ‘common core’ of globally 
applicable principles of law, which include fundamental and human rights, and with 
their help concretise internet-specific fundamental rights within the reaches of a 
‘common law’ of the Internet.
II. Digital Horizontal Effect in German Law
1. ‘Indirect’ Horizontal Effect within the Internet
In our first case of ‘oil-of-elf.de’, where the application of German Law is not 
contested, conventional horizontal effect doctrines seem to present few problems: the 
notion of the ‘indirect’ horizontal effect of fundamental rights in private law is surely 
founded on firm doctrinal ground. Nonetheless, recent, and ever more trenchant 
criticism of this doctrine, in particular, private law critiques, might require us to cast 
our ‘easy case’ in a different light, especially if horizontal effect against third parties 
is to be included within the ‘new-type’ jurisdiction of the Internet. But what is the 
meaning of ‘indirect’ horizontal effect in this context? The currently predominant 
view, which rejects the ‘direct’ transformation of fundamental into subjective private 
legal rights, and which instead seeks ‘indirect’ transposition through the general 
clauses of private law is, simply-stated, inadequate.21 Concerned only with the 
21 Cf., for a small representative overview of the, by now inaccessibly bulky, literature on the 
horizontal effect of fundamental rights, Hans D. Jarass, Die Grundrechte: 
Abwehrrechte und objektive Grundsatznormen. Objektive Grundrechtsgehalte, 
insbes. Schutzpflichten und privatrechtsgestaltende Wirkung, in FESTSCHRIFT 50 
JAHRE BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHT 35 (Badura/Horst Dreier eds., 2001); 
Claus W. Canaris, GRUNDRECHTE UND PRIVATRECHT: EINE 
ZWISCHENBILANZ (1999); Uwe Diederichsen, Das Bundesverfassungsgericht als 
oberstes Zivilgericht, AcP 171 (1998); ibidem, Die Selbstbehauptung des Privatrechts 
13
integrity of private law doctrine, such a view fails even to notice the two questions 
which are determinative for horizontal effect in non-statal social spheres: (1) which 
particular risks do the internal dynamics of each social sphere pose to autonomy; and 
(2), in which consequent manner must fundamental rights be reconstructed within 
each social sphere, such that they might act as effective foil to that sphere’s internal 
gegenüber dem Grundgesetz, JA 57 (1997); Dieter Medicus, DER GRUNDSATZ 
DER VERHÄLTNISMÄSSIGKEIT IM DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHT (1997); 
Eike Schmidt, Verfassungsgerichtliche Einwirkungen auf zivilistische 
Grundprinzipien und Institutionen, KritV 424 (1995); Johannes Hager, Grundrechte 
im Privatrecht, JZ 373 (1994); Stephan Oeter, Drittwirkung der Grundrechte und die 
Autonomie des Privatrechts, AöR 529 (1994); Konrad Hesse, 
VERFASSUNGSRECHT UND PRIVATRECHT (1988); Robert Alexy, THEORIE 
DER GRUNDRECHTE 475 (1985); Walter Leisner, GRUNDRECHTE UND 
PRIVATRECHT (1960); Guenther Dürig, Grundrechte und Zivilrechtssprechung, in
VOM BONNER GRUNDGESETZ ZUR GESAMTDEUTSCHEN VERFASSUNG, 
FS. H. NAWIASKY 157 (1956). Newer theories on fundamental rights doctrine 
which approach the problem of the horizontal effect of fundamental rights as a ‘multi-
polar legal relationship’ (mehrpolige Grundrechtsverhältnis), or seek to re-interpret 
the issue as a triangular relationship between State (State, Administration, Justice 
System) and the two parties in conflict, are nonetheless inappropriate, deriving as 
they do from the narrow public law perspective of the transposition of the political 
constitution to society. Cf., with particular regard to this point, Christian Calliess, 
RECHTSSTAAT UND UMWELTSTAAT  – ZUGLEICH EIN BEITRAG ZUR 
GRUNDRECHTSDOGMATIK IM RAHMEN MEHRPOLIGER 
VERFASSUNGSRECHTSVERHÄLTNISSE (2001) and Matthias Ruffert, 
VORRANG DER VERFASSUNG UND EIGENSTÄNDIGKEIT DES 
PRIVATRECHTS – EINE VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE UNTERSUCHUNG 
ZUR PRIVATRECHTSWIRKUNG DES GRUNDGESETZES (2001). For a systems 
theory informed critique, cf., Gunther Teubner, Ein Fall von struktureller 
Korruption? Die Familienbürgschaft in der Kollision unverträglicher 
Handlungslogiken, KritV 388 (2000); from the perspective of democracy theory, 
Oliver Gerstenberg, Verfassung und die Grenzen judizieller Sozialregulierung, in 
VERANTWORTUNG IN RECHT UND MORAL 141 (Ulrich Neumann/Lorenz 
Schulz eds., 2000).
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dynamics? The extension of the statally-conceived fundamental rights relationship to 
the context of private governance regimes, cannot simply be based upon ‘private-law-
appropriate’ formulations, but must instead be founded within ‘social-system-
appropriate’ reformulation of all of the elements of the classical fundamental rights 
model: individual-state-power-subjective law.22 This is an issue tackled in more detail 
elsewhere.23 With regard to the social sphere of the economy, however, such a 
transformation of fundamental rights is already far advanced since endeavours have 
been made to respond to the dangers posed to fundamental rights by market processes 
through the ‘market-appropriate’ reformulation of fundamental rights. The same holds 
true for fundamental rights risks in formally organised social spheres, which doctrine 
has sought to combat through the ‘organisation-appropriate’ proceduralisation of 
fundamental rights. 
Within the social sphere of the Internet, by contrast, such questions—a necessary pre-
condition for the ‘internet-specific’ constituting of fundamental rights—have yet to be 
posed. Here, the famously touted ‘Internet Code’, the digitalised embodiment of 
norms of conduct within the architecture of Cyberspace, becomes the central focus for 
22 Christoph Graber and Gunther Teubner attempt such an approach in the private context of 
artistic freedom, cf., Art and Money: Constitutional Rights in the Private Sphere, 
OXFORD JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 61 (1998). Cf., for the English debate 
on fundamental rights in the private context, Andrew Clapham, HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1996); Hugh Collins, JUSTICE IN DISMISSAL 
(1992); Joseph Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); W. N. Nelson, 
Human Rights and Human Obligations, 23 NOMOS  281 (1981).
23
 Gunther Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen: Alternativen zur staatszentrierten 
Verfassungstheorie, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES 
RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT (2003); ibidem, Vertragswelten: Das Recht in der 
Fragmentierung von Private Governance Regimes, RECHTSHISTORISCHES 
JOURNAL 234 (1998), at 257; Christoph Graber/Gunther Teubner, see supra, note 
22.
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attention.24 Initially, the question is one of the specific risks inherent to fundamental 
rights within the Internet: which particular dangers do the Code’s rules of conduct 
pose to individual autonomy? Further, how does the Code perceive of the autonomy 
of economic institutions? Then comes the question of how it is best to reconstruct 
fundamental rights in a manner appropriate to the network: what subject matter and 
which procedural codes must be read into the Code in order to ensure that individual 
fundamental rights and institutional spheres of autonomy are adequately protected 
against digital manifestations of legal norms? 
This is not primarily a matter of the misuse of digital power positions. Rather, the 
issue is one of the consequences for fundamental rights of the structural differences 
between ‘Code’ and ‘law’. The effort to reformulate the horizontal effect doctrine 
must take the basic structures of the Internet into account. Within its borders, the 
Code founds a new basis for the normative ordering of the symbolic realm of the 
Internet, because the conduct of network participants is regulated by the electronic 
constraints of Network Protocols rather than by legal norms. What impact does the 
reorientation from ‘legal norms’ to ‘Network Protocols’ have upon the Internet 
Communication Constitution (decisions and forms of argument) and on individual and 
institutional autonomy (fundamental rights)? What dangers does the ‘digital 
embodiment of law’ pose to fundamental rights?
24
 Debate on the code almost has a natural law quality about it, cf., Emile Brousseau, Internet 
Regulation: Does Self Regulation Require an Institutional Framework, Conference 
Paper (2001), available at http://www.isnie.org/ISNIE01/Papers01/broussaeu.pdf; 
Lawrence Lessig, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through 
Technology, 76 TEXAS L. REV. 553 (1998), available at
http://reidenberg.home.sprynet.com/lex_informatica.pdf; James Boyle, Foucault in 
Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty, and Hard-Wired Censors, (1997), available 
at www.wcl.american.edu/pub/faculty/boyle/foucault.htm. 
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2. Code-Specific Risks to Fundamental Rights and Code-Specific 
Fundamental Rights Protection 
An initial answer is derived from the ‘self-enforcing’ character of the code. 
Predominantly instrumentalist-interventionist Internet lawyers, might well view this 
as being the great advantage of the Code;25 it is nonetheless the bugbear of the 
traditional rule-of-law-based State (Rechtsstaat). Traditional law is founded in correct 
procedures and clear distinctions between law production, the application of law and 
its coercive enforcement. This is also to a large part true for law making processes in 
the private sector. Digitalisation, however, appears to have effected a form of fission 
between law-making, application and enforcement. With this, the constitutional 
division of powers within legal processes evaporates, taking with it an important 
guarantee for individual and institutional spheres of autonomy.
A second indicator derives from the ‘conduct-control, expectation-building and 
conflict-resolution’ triad.26 Traditional law cannot be limited to any one of these 
functions, but effects all three, albeit in a disassociated form, with each function 
served by its own institutions, own legal culture and own form of rule of law. This 
division likewise embodies a (secret) constitutional guarantee for social autonomy. 
Higher normative prescriptions that facilitate conflict resolution, do not necessarily 
require institutionalisation as socially effective expectations; nor yet must they always 
be translated into real world conduct. However, the Code’s digital embodiment of 
legal norms nonetheless reduces this triad to a single function of electronic conduct 
control, and so dissolves the autonomy securing buffer zones between conflict norms, 
expectation norms and conduct norms. The Internet Code dispenses with the civilising 
25
 Seen from this instrumentalist point of view, the differences beween the two protagonists of 
the Internet Constitution are few indeed: Lawrence Lessig, see supra, note 24; David 
Post, Anarchy, State, and the Internet: An Essay on Law-Making in Cyberspace, J. 
ONLINE L. (1995), available at
http://warthog.cc.wm.edu/law/publications/jol/post.html.
26 Cf, for this legal functional triad, cf., Niklas Luhmann, DAS RECHT DER 
GESELLSCHAFT (1993), at 156. 
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achievement of disassociation and with the constitutional/rule-of-law based securing 
of each of the three functions within the triad.
A further aspect of the Code that has potential relevance to fundamental rights is its 
exact mode of calculating normativity. Traditionally speaking, much vaunted legal 
formalism was only ever partially possible. The—either much admired or much 
feared by lawyers—impact of conventional legal formalism is, however, as nothing 
when compared to the extent of digitalisation achieved by the code, which has per 
force given rise to an as yet unheard of degree of norm formality. The strict binary 
formulation, 0-1, which is only relevant to a real world legal code in the systems 
theoretical sense of the distinction between ‘legal’ and ‘non-legal’, extends, in a 
virtual world of legal programmes, to inform legal decision-making in its entirety. 
This precludes any room for interpretational manoeuvre within the programmes 
throughout the entire jurisdiction of the Code. Normative conduct expectations, which 
could always be interpreted, adapted, manipulated or bent, are becoming rigid 
cognitive expectations of factual circumstances (inclusion/exclusion). The esoteric 
forms of learning, which were always to be found in the permanent microvarations of 
law in the face of new facts or new social values, are excluded from the Code. Even 
legal arguments are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Code. Arguments can only 
be made at the time of the Code’s promulgation or its official amendment, and no 
longer influence the day-to-day legal task of the interpretation, application and 
implementation of norms. At core, this means that all informality is excluded from the 
jurisdictional reach of the Code. The Code has no room for those functions that were 
always allowed within traditional law: the making of exemptions, the application of 
equitable principles, the non-application of law, or, the simple recourse to non-legal 
forms of communication. Digitalisation precludes the informal non-application of the 
Code. Given the demise of ‘useful illegality’, it is no wonder that the figure of the 
Hacker who endeavours to break the Code has become the modern embodiment of the 
Robin Hood myth.
If this is a true impression of the dangers that the Code poses to autonomy, then the 
constitutional character of various legal policy demands made of the code is 
undeniable. The Open-Source-Movement, which demands publication of the Source 
Code in software marketing materials so that programme control structures can 
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always be checked, should not simply be dismissed as a bunch of ‘nice’ idealists.27
Equally, Lessing’s demand that the Code’s digitalised conduct control mechanisms be 
subject to the principle of ‘narrow tailoring’, entails a parallel demand for intensified 
application of the principle of constitutional proportionality to the Code, in order to 
bring it in line with legal norms that must also be respected by private actors. In this 
context, Judicial control, as well as other forms of public control over the meta-norms 
of the Code are far more important than comparable oversight of standard contract 
terms or the terms used by private associations in the real world. The same holds true 
for internet competition law, which not only secures open markets, but also impacts 
upon the continued openness of alternative Code regulations.
To return to our original case: naturally, not all of these Code-specific risks to 
autonomy are relevant to the ‘oil-of-elf’ conflict. Instead, other issues, in particular, 
access to Internet Providers and the selectivity of search machines, to name but two, 
must also be considered. Nonetheless, we can identify some internet-specific risks to 
fundamental rights and internet-adequate reactions within the CompanyNameSucks
cases, which do have an influence on conflict resolution. The intensity of the conflict 
between name and trade name owner and its opponent is particularly marked within 
the Internet. The domain name system does not allow for the same degree of name-
usage flexibility as does a real world, in which the legitimate use of trademarks and 
names can be differentiated along product, market and regional lines, such that 
multiple name-usage is often conflict free. The Internet, can only provide one global 
address in the Top Level Domain. Equally, differentiation between different TLDs is 
inadequate compensation for this deficit. In addition, such Code-specific monopoly 
effects are only intensified by the widespread practice of ‘reverse domain hijacking’, 
against which there is no judicial recourse. In addition to registering their own 
companyname, concerns also register companynamesucks, companynamereallysucks, 
companynamereallyreallysucks, etc. in the effort fully to secure both the core and 
periphery of the semantic reach of their name. The social cushioning effects of ‘useful 
27 Cf., Yochai Benkler, Looking Trough the Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations 
of the Public Domain , Conference Paper (2001), available at http://james-boyle.com; 
Lawrence Lessig, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS (2001), at 13.
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illegality’ cannot be relied upon in this context. Once ICANN approved host 
providers have authorised IP Addresses or domain names, or, once the decisions of 
the ICANN Panels have been electronically implemented, there follows an automatic 
process within the Internet, which no longer tolerates a grey zone between ‘illegal’ 
yet, pragmatically-speaking, ‘allowable’ name-usage.
In addition to risks to fundamental rights, our introductory case also raises internet-
specific questions in relation to the content of fundamental rights protection. The 
question is one of how a public sphere can be created within the decentralised realm 
of the Internet at all. How can critique of FinaTotalElf’s company policy be 
transmitted to the appropriate audience? The search is on for internet-specific 
equivalents to the mass media, on the one hand, and to those local protest movements, 
on the other, who can enforce fundamental rights protection for their criticisms of 
trade-practice against the company’s place of business. In principle, the company’s 
web-site is the equivalent of the company’s place of business in the real world, and 
the domain name, the determinative locus for the creation of a public sphere of 
political debate on the company. This is the primary argument in support of the 
extension of fundamental rights protection to parodies or critiques of the company’s 
trademark. 
III. Digital Horizontal Effect within the UDRP?
Once again, we American panellists have tended to assume that American 
jurisprudence and American Constitutional protections should be given 
precedence on the Internet.28
Scott Donahey, Panellist
So, what is the situation as regards the digital horizontal effect of fundamental rights 
within the UDRP?29 A case decided by an ICANN Panel provides us with an initial 
28 Cf., Scott M. Donahey, Divergence in the UDRP and the Need for Appellate Review, 
(2002), available at http://udrplaw.net/DonaheyPaper.htm.
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picture of the problem. In the precedent-setting case, Bridgestone Firestone et al v. 
Jack Myers (D2000-0190), the Panel stated:
[A]lthough free speech is not listed as one of the Policy’s examples of a right or 
legitimate interest in a domain name, the list is not exclusive, and the panel 
concludes that the exercise of free speech for criticism and commentary also 
demonstrates a right or legitimate interest in the domain name under Paragraph 
4 (c)(iii). The Internet is above all a framework for global communication, and 
the right to free speech should be one of the foundations of internet law.
This is an explicit acceptance by the ICANN Panel of the digital jurisdiction of 
fundamental rights. But what are such often reproduced professions of the creed of 
fundamental rights founded upon? On which legal basis do they rest? The obiter of 
the ICANN Panels remains opaque and vague on this point. To be sure, there is clarity 
that the use of a domain name in pursuit of the right to free speech is a legitimate and 
founded interest under Paragraph 4(c)(iii). However, there is no indication of the legal 
wellspring of the free speech rights to which the Panels refer.
Is the First Amendment of the American Constitution the source of decisions that 
make use of such formulas as, ‘free speech doctrines’, ‘inalienable freedom of speech 
and expression’, or simply, ‘free speech’? Certainly, ICANN Panels do orient 
29 Cf, on the issue of the horizontal direct effect of fundamental rights within the UDRP, 
Adam Goldstein, ICANNSucks.biz (And Why You Can’t Say That): How Fair Use of 
Trademarks in domain names is Being Restrained, 12 FORDHAM INTEL. PROP., 
MED. & ENTER. L. J. 1151 (2002); Milton Mueller, RULING THE ROOT –
INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING OF CYBERSPACE (2002), at 
245; Keith Blackman, The Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy: A 
Cheaper Way to Hijack Names and Supress Critics, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 211 
(2001); David C. Najarian, Internet Domains and Trademarks Claims: First 
Amendment Considerations, 41 J. L. & TECH. 127 (2001), also available at
http://www.idea.piercelaw.edu/articles/41/41_1/5.Najarian.pdf; Rebecca S. Sorgen, 
Trademark Confronts Free Speech on the Information Superhighway: 
“Cybergripers” Face a Constitutional Collision, 22 LOYOLA L. A. ENTER. L. 
REV. 115 (2001). 
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themselves in line with US jurisprudence and legislation. This is often the case when 
the conflict is strongly connected with the US legal order. Thus, the Panel in the 
foregoing case noted that:
in applying the definition of abusive registration ... in the administrative 
procedure, the panel of decision-makers appointed in the procedure shall, to the 
extent necessary, make reference to the law or rule of laws that it determines to 
be applicable in view of the circumstances of the case. Thus, for example, if the 
parties to the procedure were resident in one country, the domain name was 
registered through a registrar in that country and the evidence of bad faith 
registration and use of the domain name related to activity in the same country, 
it would be appropriate for the decision-maker to refer to the law of the country 
concerned in applying the definition.
The panel interpretation seems also to comply with the provisions of the WIPO ‘Final 
Report’. The WIPO ‘Final Report’ states that:
the consequence of this would be that people in countries with strong protection 
for freedom of expression would have greater protection in the WIPO 
alternative dispute resolution than would people from, for example, North 
Korea.30
It might nonetheless be doubted whether the division of the Internet into distinct 
spheres of influence for national protection standards is at all desirable, at least in the 
case of generic TLDs. In addition, solutions founded in conflicts rules would also 
greatly overwhelm the information processing capacities of the ICANN Panels.31
Can we accordingly argue that ICANN Panels are wholly inappropriate fora for cases 
entailing fundamental rights issues? This, for example is the opinion of Blackman, 
who accepts that fundamental rights must be given horizontal effect in such contexts, 
30 Michael A. Froomkin, ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy - Causes and (Partial) 
Cures, BROOKLIN L. REV. 637 (2002), at 640.
31 See Michael A. Froomkin, supra note 30, at 643.
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but argues that ICANN Panels are institutionally unsuited to such decisions.32 He 
furthermore suggests that jurisdiction should be refused for ‘hard cases’ and the 
complainant directed to national courts: ‘the court system is the only viable institution 
that can resolve these questions’.33 Blackman’s approach is, in large part, justified. He 
nonetheless pays insufficient regard to the foundations upon which such a 
transnational system of arbitration must be built. The division between ‘easy cases’ 
and ‘hard cases’ would lead, in the vast majority of conflicts—very few of which are 
clear cases of ‘cybersquatting’—to full-scale withdrawal of the ICANN-Panel 
jurisdiction, fatally undermining the advantages of this alternative dispute resolution 
system. Accordingly, we must look to wholly different mechanisms of effective 
control over ICANN Panel’ decisions.
IV. ‘Ordre public transnational’ of the ‘lex mercatoria’ and of the ‘lex 
digitalis’? 
1. An Autonomous Legal Order?
Brief consideration of the paradigmatic case of a non-statal autonomous legal order 
with a transnational jurisdiction, the famous lex mercatoria, proves valuable here. Can 
comparison with the ordre public transnational of international economic law furnish 
us with hooks upon which to hang our solution to the problem of the horizontal effect 
of fundamental rights in the private sphere of the Internet? In order to avoid all 
misunderstandings from the very outset: in neither case are we concerned with 
autarky, or a self-sufficient legal order which is isolated from political regulation and 
rests solely upon self-regulation. Both the lex digitalis and the lex mercatoria are 
clearly hybrid rule-systems, each with their own particular portions of autonomous 
law, national law and international law.34 Not even a global Bukowina can fully free 
32 See Keith Blackman, supra note 29.
33 See Keith Blackman, supra note 29, at 241.
34
 Systems theory argues that this plurality was always a part of the lex mercatoria. ‘Our 
definitive question would be: where are norms actually produced. In national politics 
and in international political relations? Or in global economic and other social 
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itself from the influences of the metropolis, but is instead, to use a popular metaphor, 
a ‘semi autonomous social field’.35
In addition, however, the lex mercatoria has historically been long acquainted with 
passionate doctrinal and legal theoretical debate on its ‘legal quality’ and has built up 
extensive experience of international dispute resolution. In rebuff to all statist 
critiques, which once dismissed the lex mercatoria as a ‘phantom of theorising 
Sorbonne professors’ and held the existence of elements of a non-statal, and at the 
same time ‘a-national’ law to be wholly inconceivable, not least the current economic 
success of the lex mercatoria has now surely secured its recognition as an 
autonomous legal order.36 Are the most advanced definitions of the lex mercatoria
now applicable to the lex digitalis? Can the following four characteristics be identified 
within ICANN Panel practice?
(i) ‘[a] third-level autonomous legal system beyond municipal and public 
international law’ with a claim to global validity;
(ii) which is ‘created and developed by the law-making forces of an emerging 
global civil society’;
processes? The hypothesis also seems to be well founded in legal experience that a 
global economic law is developing along all three dimensions. Of course, this 
presupposes a pluralistic theory of norm production which treats political, legal and
social law production on an equal footing’, cf., Gunther Teubner, Globale Bukowina: 
Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 
(Gunther Teubner ed., 1997), at 11.
35
 Sally F. Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW AND SOCIETY REVIEW 719 (1973).
36
 For an informative discussion of the theoretical debates on the lex mercatoria and its legal 
quality, cf., Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and 
Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L. J. 400 (2002); Klaus P. Berger, The Law Merchant 
and the New Market Place: A 21st Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, 
INTER’L ARB. L. REV. 91 (2000). 
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(iii) which is ‘founded on general principles of law as well as social usages’; and
(iv) which is ‘administered by private dispute resolution service providers and 
codifies (if at all) by private norm formulating agencies’.37
Rather than open up a discussion at this point on the fundamental issue of whether a 
‘global Bukowina’ is also to be found in Cyberspace, the analysis moves on to 
compare the legal quality each rule system. The question to be clarified is one of 
whether the jurisdiction of the far more problematic lex digitalis is more or less 
closely related to traditional legal phenomena that the, in the meanwhile, far more 
firmly established lex mercatoria.
Both systems are concerned with a process of conflict resolution to which both parties 
have given their consent. Both are distinguished from simple arbitration systems in 
that a third party gives binding decisions. In contrast to ‘equitable arbitration’, 
decisions are neither taken on equitable grounds alone, nor are they given on no 
grounds at all. Rather, ICANN Panels apply, lege artis, the norms of the UDRP, 
which in content and method appears identical to the application of ‘real’ legal norms. 
Just as in international economic conflict resolution, an elaborated process of norm 
application gives final judgment on the legality/illegality of the desired conduct. 
Findings regularly include the requisite elements of factual analysis, interpretation of 
norms and the subsuming of facts under norms.
Each case concerns a non-statal and ‘a-national’ system of rule application. The 
jurisdiction of the lex mercatoria includes contracts, business practices, standard 
contract terms, restatements of law (unidroit principles of international economic law, 
the Lando ‘common core’ principles of European contract law) and the decisions 
taken by courts of arbitration. The lex digitalis is likewise founded within the private 
autonomous acts of internet-users, the explicit rules of the UDRP, the ‘Rules for 
Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy’ as well as the individual ‘Supplementary Rules’ 
37
 Gralf P. Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and the 
Civilisation of Private Law, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185 
(2002), at 188.
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of ICANN accredited ‘Dispute Resolution Providers’, and, finally, the Decisions of 
ICANN Panels.
Each web of rules has a far stronger affinity with common law than with continental 
codified law. They expand incrementally through individual decisions and precedent. 
Neither system plays host to a uniform hierarchy of decisional instances, but both 
display a prominent reliance upon heterarchical references to other courts of 
arbitration, as is common in the courts of countries applying ‘common law’. 
International economic law plays host to mutual inter-citation between courts of 
arbitration and, in particular between the ‘Big Three’ (New York, Paris, Tehran); a 
process which is strengthened by the endeavours of legal science to distil uniform 
legal principles and norms from the decisions of the different courts of arbitration.
Here, however, the first real differences between the systems can be identified. While 
the smooth development of the lex mercatoria into a genuine common law is 
hampered by the fact that cases cannot be decided publicly and by the fact that very 
few are published in case reports or journals, and then only in summary form, ICANN 
Panel practice presents us with far stronger indicators of its evolution to a proper case-
law.38 Many Panel decisions are published on the Internet and can be referred to in 
legal debate on practice and doctrine. ICANN Panels themselves make explicit 
reference to decided cases and strictly follow, though without formally pre-empting 
their decisions, stare decisis in cases of precedent. They also distinguish facts and
overrule case-law norms.
To be sure, the practice of the lex digitalis gives rise to the same high degree of 
decisional inconsistency that has long been notorious within national courtrooms 
when the lex mercatoria has made an appearance.39 However, although it is, currently 
38 Cf., for the relevant suggestions of Gralf P. Calliess, note 37, at 201.
39
 Despite high degrees of inconstency between the decisions of ICANN-Panels, we can 
identify the emergence of a global ‘common law’ in relation to the abusive 
registration of domain names, cf., Robert Badgley, Internet Domain Names and 
ICANN Arbitration: The Emerging “Law“ of Domain Name Custody Disputes, 5 
TEXAS REV. OF LAW AND POLITICS 343 (2001).
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at least, unrealistic to hope for a hierarchy of courts and for more decisional 
consistency within international economic arbitration, the Internet has far greater 
potential in this regard. Legal debates have already suggested that an important step in 
the evolution of this hybrid legal order would be the establishment of an appeal 
instance within the ICANN arbitration jurisdiction, which would seek to create 
consistency out of the many diverging decisions to be found in practice.40
The legal quality of the lex digitialis is also far stronger than that of the lex mercatoria
in a further respect. The legal nature of international economic arbitration is often 
doubted since it does not apply sufficiently precise decisional norms and instead 
resorts to insufficiently transcribed rules, vague directions and general principles. By 
contrast—a requirement of the Code—the decisional norms of ICANN Judges are 
characterised by their highly explicit nature, their careful transcription and their 
factual precision. This is true both for UDRP rules and for the decisions of the Panels 
themselves.
Political legitimacy is undoubtedly the Achilles heal of both autonomous legal 
systems. In principle, neither can claim to be linked into the usual legitimation chain 
of democratic will creation—though this is also true for large parts of the national 
legal order whose legal character is nonetheless not doubted. At best, traces of 
political legitimation can be found within the lex mercatoria. The New York 
Convention provides for a degree of legitimation for international arbitration in 
international law. Ironically, however, this does not increase, but instead restricts the 
potential for public democratic control over autonomous law-making. By contrast, the 
lex digitalis can lay claim to a far stronger chain of political legitimation in the 
character of periodically renewed agreements between ICANN and the US 
Department of Economics.41 Further political legitimation can be derived from the 
process whereby the rules of the UDRP are laid down. At the behest of the US 
Government, the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) organised an 
40 Cf., on this point, the suggestion of Scott M. Donahey, supra note 28.
41 Cf., for the history of the establishment of ICANN and its relationship with the American 
Government, cf, Milton Mueller, supra note 29.
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extensive international consultation process, whose preliminary findings were then, in 
large part, used by the non-profit organisation, ICANN, as the basis for its own 
private norm production.
The greatest differences between the lex digitalis and the lex mercatoria are to be 
found in relation to the sanctions applied by them and the carrying through, 
enforcement and implementation of their decisions. Taking its key from authors as 
diverse as Austin, Weber and Kelsen, traditional legal theory measures legal character 
against the yardstick of sanctions. Here we find the strongest objection to the 
autonomous nature of the lex mercatoria: when it comes to it, the informal sanctions 
applied by the market are not sufficient and recognition must be given to decisions by 
national courts in order to ensure implementation through national jurisdictions. The 
very core of its legal quality is thus placed in doubt. The situation is wholly different 
as regards Internet enforcement. Following a ten-day period, during which the parties 
have the possibility to approach formal courts, the ICANN Panels give notice to the 
‘Registrar’ directly to execute their decisions electronically. The Registrar either 
deletes the entry or transfers the domain name to the complainant with direct legal 
effect.
Comparison leads to a somewhat surprising conclusion. The practices of still 
adolescent ICANN Panels, the precedent system and the nature of the norms applied, 
taken together with their stronger degree of political legitimation and, above all, the 
mode in which their decisions are effectively enforced, furnish the lex digitalis with a 
far stronger degree of legal quality than that provided by the practices of a by now old 
and treasured lex mercatoria, whose recognition as an autonomous legal order by 
national courts and international legal doctrine, although not complete, is, at the very 
least, far more developed.
 2. The Validity of Fundamental Rights in an Autonomous Legal Regime?
With this, the lex digitalis counts, together with the lex mercatoria and other 
autonomous legal regimes, as one of those legal phenomena, which have cast the 
globalisation of law in a light very different from the usual one. Globalisation is thus 
not simply a matter of the unification, harmonisation, or, at the very least, the 
convergence of legal orders, but is, instead, one of a dramatic change in the 
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differentiations made within the legal system itself. Traditionally, the global legal 
order is divided into relatively autonomous national legal orders. Today, such 
distinctions have not become redundant, but have instead been overlaid by a different 
principle of differentiation: the law is also divided into autonomous transnational 
legal regimes, which define their jurisdiction along ‘issue-specific’ rather than 
territorial lines, and which lay claim to global validity.42 Regardless of whether they 
are founded within the private contractual relationships of transnational actors or 
whether they are hybrid in nature, such systems are genuine legal regimes (and not 
just political or economic compendiums, or a loose ensemble of social norms), since 
they possess their own constitutional institutions, which reflexively normatise their 
norm-making processes. In other words, their primary norm-making processes are 
subject to the autonomous procedures of secondary decision-making and normatising 
processes, which establish the legal quality of primary norms.43
It is this secondary, constitutional normatising process which decides the question of 
the validity of fundamental rights within autonomous Internet law. A comparative 
glance at the lex mercatoria is one again valuable. It is of course evident that the lex 
mercatoria is founded within private contractual relationships and that it is these 
contrats sans loi that form the basis both for its material norms and for the 
institutionalisation of international courts of arbitration. Nonetheless, this leaves the 
system facing a seemingly insoluble dilemma: if the lex mercatoria educes from a 
private contract, how can it enforce fundamental rights as mandatory law against the 
wishes of the parties to the contract? As a consequence of this, the existence of 
42
 With a particular emphasis upon the status of ICANN as a ‘Global Regulatory Regime’, cf., 
the analyses of Dirk Lehmkuhl, The Resolution of Domain Names vs. Trademark 
Conflicts: A Case Study on regulation Beyond the Nation State, and Related 
Problems, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 61 (2002), at 71; Milton 
Mueller, supra note 29, at 211; Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)national 
Governance – Possibilities for and Limits to the Development of an International 
Constitutional Law, 44 GERMAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171 
(2001), at 186.
43 Cf., Gunther Teubner (2003), supra note 23.
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mandatory law within the lex mercatoria has been doubted. Wholly pragmatically, 
however, and without any consideration of underlying theoretical legal issues, courts 
of arbitration have evolved a practice, which might prove to be a future model for the 
lex digitalis:
It is generally recognized that the arbitrator can, in the name of ‘truly 
international public policy,’ refuse to give effect to certain agreements of the 
parties. Likewise, if the object of a law is to guarantee the respect of principles 
the arbitral tribunal considers as forming a part of transnational or ‘truly’ 
international public policy, it must find that such law prevails over the will of 
the parties.
The content of transnational public policy is not well-defined. It is usually 
paraphrased as ‘fundamental principles of civilized nations’. These principles 
may encompass ... basic procedural and conflict principles, prohibition of 
unlawful expropriations, and the refusal to recognize the effect of corporate 
personality in certain situations of abuse .... [and] violations of human rights, 
drug dealing, or terrorism as violations of transnational public policy.44
In this case, a secondary constitutional normatising process swings into action, 
looking beyond the traditional reach of contracts, business practices, standard terms, 
‘restatements of law’ and guiding arbitration principles, to seek ‘rules of recognition’ 
for the lex mercatoria within the ‘fundamental principles of civilised nations’; rules 
that then facilitate the identification of enforceable fundamental rights within the 
autonomous legal order.45
Of course, both we, and practitioners of the lex mercatoria, are wholly aware that 
recourse to the enforceable nature of the ‘fundamental principles of civilised nations’ 
is a fiction without firm foundation in either natural law or the universal or relativistic 
44
 Nathalie Voser, Current Development: Mandatory Rules of Law as a Limitation on the Law 
Applicable in International Commercial Arbitration, 7 THE AMER. REV. of  
INTER’L ARB. 319 (1996), at 349.
45
 Ursula Stein, LEX MERCATORIA – REALITÄT UND THEORIE (1995), at 170.
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philosophies of human rights theory. Such fictions, however, are a necessary starting 
point for the case-law based concretisation of fundamental rights within each legal 
regime. In a more positive formulation: they furnish courts of arbitration with a 
semantic material which, although it possesses no real legal character of its own, 
allows for the concrete anchoring of fundamental rights within the lex mercatoria or 
the lex digitalis.
The enforceable nature of fundamental rights within the Internet educes from two 
sources: on the one hand, the fiction of a ‘common core’ of ‘fundamental principles of 
civilised nations’; on the other, the norm concretising effects of arbitration decisions, 
which, much in the manner of common law, construct and constitute a catalogue of 
enforceable fundamental rights within the autonomous legal regime of the Internet, 
adapting rights created to suit conditions within national and statal orders, in order to 
combat specific digital dangers to autonomy and to take advantage of specific digital 
opportunities for fundamental rights development. 
This provides us with indicators of how to resolve fundamental rights conflicts 
between national orders within the Internet. Such conflicts have been caused within 
the law of domain name recognition by the registration of names such as 
bundesinnenministerium.com (internalministry.com) and verfassungsschutz.org
(constitutionalprotection.org) by Nazi organisations.46 It is no longer appropriate to 
apportion such disputes to a conflicts law, which is required to identify the 
jurisdictional reach of each national set of fundamental rights criteria in order to find a 
solution within only one of the relevant legal orders. The arbitrary nature of the 
choice of only one national standard of fundamental rights protection within the 
Internet is clear. ICANN judges would be much better advised to seek and develop 
46
 Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Federal Republic of Germany) v. RJG Engineering Inc.Case 
(D2001-1401); Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Republic of Germany) v. RJG 
Engineering Inc./Gerhard Lauck (D2002-0110).
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their own, Internet-wide applicable, standards of rights protection in reflexive debate 
with their own epistemic community and general public opinion.47
47
 Empirical studies by social scientists such as Michael Geist, in particular, have kindled a 
lively debate on the decisional practice of ICANN-Panels, Michael Geist, Fair.com? 
An Examination of the Allegations of Systemic Unfairness in ICANN UDRP, (August 
2001), available at http://aix1u0ttawy.ca/~geist/.
